Written by Ahan Garg and Vitthala Agarwal
A positive step forward in India’s journey towards full inclusivity of people with disabilities [“PwDs”]was the introduction of theRights of Persons with Disabilities Act[“Act”],2016. However, the intent of the Act is often not put into practice, as Section 20 of the Act requires that those with disabilities are to be treated fairly by providing them with reasonable accommodations. However, the vague language in this Act and the lack of enforcement render the application of these provisions ineffective. This blog examines the legal framework, its limitations, and reasons for the state to be more proactive in making Section 20 an enforceable right that truly recognises and guarantees dignity and equality in public employment.
A significant shift in the mindset of the legislators towards the PwDs, who are often looked at as dependent, to make them atmanirbhar in the truest sense, was marked with India’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [“UNCRPD”] in 2007. This ultimately led to the introduction of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. This 2016 Act aims towards a more equitable and an inclusive society, ensuring that persons with disabilities can fully participate in the system without facing any barriers or obstacles.
This Act requires the Governmental institutions to take proactive measures and ensure that PwDs lead their life with dignity and integrity and get an opportunity to be on par with others in truest sense.
Section 20 of this Act deals specifically with employment to achieve this aim wherein Section 20(1) prohibits discrimination in all aspects of employment, while Section 20(2) puts a positive obligation on the Government establishments to provide reasonable accommodation and an appropriate barrier-free and conducive environment to employees with disability.
On the face of it, the rights guaranteed here may seem robust, but in reality, the procedural machinery required to implement them is glaringly absent. There are three major gaps in Section 20, which create a “procedural vacuum”. This procedural vacuum proves to be a huge barrier to achieving the aim of this Act.
The first contention refers to the silence in the wording of Section 20(2) on how reasonable accommodation is to operate during the pre-employment stages, which include recruitment, selection, and onboarding. Here, the recruitment processes, including entrance tests, interviews, onboarding tools and probationary tasks, are the gateways to secure employment in these governmental establishments. Due to the denial of reasonable accommodation at this stage, many disabled candidates cannot reach the point where Section 20 is believed to come into effect and enables government employers to defer their obligations to make accommodations until the hiring process is completed, thus converting reasonable accommodation into a post-employment privilege instead of a precondition to equal access.
The second contention is regarding the term “Reasonable Accommodation” used in Section 20(2). This operative term is defined in Section 2(y) of the Act, which mirrors the definition found in Article 2 of the UNCRPD and it means the necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise of rights equally with others.” The section here promises reasonable accommodation without ever explaining what makes an accommodation reasonable, who must decide this, or on what basis. This creates an arbitrary and vague system, where in reality, the word functions less as a right and more as a shield. It gives the appearance of protection while leaving the entire content of the obligation undefined.
Thirdly, the use of the term “disproportionate burden” in the definition of reasonable accommodation creates further ambiguity as it does not explain what the burden is, how it is to be measured, or who must justify it. The phrase is inserted as a limit, but without content, without method, and without accountability. What should have functioned as a narrow exception becomes a wide opening through which the obligation itself escapes. In practice, this undefined standard gives institutions enormous discretion and almost no responsibility.
Vagueness in interpretation of such terms can have dire consequences as a visually impaired candidate may clear examinations and interviews, only to be denied screen-reading software during onboarding because the department refuses, citing disproportionate burden and claims it is “not feasible,” relies on the presence of ramps and lifts to claim compliance, and ultimately treats the candidate’s inability to perform digital tasks as personal incapacity rather than institutional failure. Nothing in Section 20 of the Act compels the authority to justify why functional access was refused or why physical infrastructure was considered sufficient.
Requests for assistive software, modified onboarding tools, flexible procedures, or task-specific adaptations are and can be routinely refused with vague references to feasibility, system limitations, or administrative difficulty, with no cost analysis produced. No further alternatives are explored. No explanation is offered as to why the burden is disproportionate rather than merely inconvenient. As a result, the right exists comfortably on paper while failing precisely where it is needed in the moment, which is when the accommodation determines whether a person can work at all.
This ambiguity plays a significant role in shaping how government offices interpret accommodation and adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. This approach is often disconnected from the actual functions and activities of the service. So by considering ramps, lifts, and accessible toilets as universal solutions, the administrators fail to recognise job considerations, such as whether the job is digital, analytical, or communication-based and also consider their legal duty and obligation discharged.
This duty, interpreted by the administrators as providing physical access and functional equality, does not deal with the performance benchmarks set, which are inherently unfair, as the disabled employees are evaluated against benchmarks designed for able-bodied colleagues, without the lack of special assistance. Thus, treating reasonable accommodation as a privilege rather than a condition that makes merit-based evaluation.
The above-mentioned gaps have resulted in inconsistent and ad hoc decision-making across government departments, which have highlighted the need for binding accommodation guidelines that clearly define reasonable accommodation in different service contexts and apply uniformly to all government establishments. Such guidelines would shift accommodation from being treated as a favour for the disabled to a legally enforceable obligation that ensures the correct implementation of the law.
Furthermore, the burden of justifying accommodation must be reversed, and there must be a presumption in favour of accommodation, where accommodation is considered necessary and reasonable by default. This would ensure that any denial would be exceptional, reasoned, and recorded in writing with a clear explanation as to why such an alleged burden is disproportionate to its benefit. Moreover, such reasonable accommodation cannot operate in isolation from service rules, as it must be considered and integrated into performance appraisals, probation and confirmation process so that disabled employees are not penalised for institutional failures of non-accessibility. Additionally, periodic accessibility and accommodation assessment, along with a mandatory report on any accommodation requests and outcomes, should be prepared to ensure sustained compliance with the guidelines and a maintained record.
In conclusion, the state cannot demand efficiency from its employees while denying them the conditions necessary to achieve it. Thus, to not only strengthen dignity but also to enhance productivity and reinforce institutional legitimacy, it is necessary to provide such reasonable accommodation and implement it meaningfully.